DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD

| TO: | J. Kent Fortenberry, Technical Director |
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| FROM: | Donald Owen, Oak Ridge Site Representative |
| SUBJ: | Activity Report for Week Ending April 11, 2003 |

Staff member Donald Owen reported for duty on Tuesday as the Board's Oak Ridge site representative.

A. <u>Y-12 Environmental, Safety and Health (ES&H) Review.</u> As reported on March 28th, a team from the DOE Headquarters Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA) had completed its 2-week review of ES&H management at Y-12. The review focused on feedback and improvement, functionality of safety systems, roles and responsibilities, and the requirements management process. This week, a formal briefing of the results was provided to Y-12 management. The OA team noted substantial improvement in overall implementation of Integrated Safety Management (ISM) at Y-12 during the last few years, identifying positive attributes in areas such as YSO oversight and self-assessment, BWXT technical procedure development and control, worker involvement in safety processes, and radioactive waste management and waste reduction. The OA team also noted that YSO and BWXT are effectively managing the implementation of safety basis efforts under 10 CFR 830, Nuclear Safety Management. Some ISM weaknesses were identified by the OA team, however, in work control for maintenance activities performed under the "skill-of-thecraft" process and for construction activities, configuration management for Building 9204-2E fire protection systems, and certain aspects of feedback and improvement. The OA team's detailed report is to be finalized in the near future and submitted to the site for development of corrective actions. (1-C)

B. <u>Y-12 Building 9204-4 Fire Protection Systems</u>. The OA review identified a potential issue at the Y-12 plant associated with sectional control valves (SCVs) in fire suppression sprinkler systems. Specifically, a potential issue with knowing that the valves are open and flow can get downstream of the SCVs. This week, BWXT reported that an investigation of their sprinkler systems identified two SCVs in Building 9204-4 that could isolate portions of a sprinkler system covered by the Building's safety basis. The site rep. observed a BWXT review of the issue that included fire protection and nuclear safety personnel with no immediate resolution. Resolution of this potential issue is pending the completion of an Unreviewed Safety Question Determination. (1-C)

cc Board Members